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1. Introduction
Historically, flooding has resulted in considerable losses, both in property damage and lives lost, 
throughout the world. According to a report by Guha-Sapir et al. (2013), 53 percent of the total 
number of victims of natural disasters worldwide in 2012 was victims of floods.  Data from the 
International Disaster Database (2013) likewise show that flooding affects millions of people1  
and causes billions of dollars in damage yearly2 . The United States annually averaged 95 
fatalities and $8.20 billion in damages from floods between 1982 and 2011 (National Weather 
Service (NWS) 2013).  In the United States, flooding makes up 80 percent of presidentially 
declared disaster losses (Landry and Li 2012). In the light of changing climates and increases in 
precipitation and sea level rise (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2012; Ludy 
and Kondolf 2012; Kousky et al. 2013), and commensurate increases in flood damages (Major et 
al. 2014), there is a concomitant need to manage flood disaster risks.  
Flood risk management, like so many environmental concerns, heavily involves 
communities and collective action as necessary parts of the problems and the solutions.  The 
Community Ratings System (CRS) was designed to encourage communities to go beyond the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) requirements and build local capacity to address flood 
risks. In so doing, communities can be more resilient towards future flood disasters.  As the CRS 
is a policy tool targeted at community-level responses, unlike regulations or taxes levied on 
individuals or firms, the CRS offers a compelling context in which to study the capacity of 
communities to undertake collective action in response to top-down incentive schemes.  
Flooding represents an environmental challenge that inherently affects communities, and 
improved ways to overcome collective action problems may become essential for community 
resilience as climate change dramatically increases flood risks (Kousky et al. 2013) and brings 
new threats.   
Communities participating in CRS can reduce their flood risks while at the same time 
enjoy discounted premiums (up to 45%) on federally required flood insurance commensurate to 
their community’s CRS score (see Table 1). Participant communities are grouped into different 
classes based on their CRS scores (class 1 to 9), which in turn determines the amount of 
premium reduction they receive. The peculiar, tiered nature of this incentive scheme presents an 
1 “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, University catholique de 
Louvain, Brussels, Bel.” Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hazards/statistics/?hid=62. 
2 “EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, University catholique de 
Louvain, Brussels, Bel.” Available at: http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hazards/statistics/?hid=62. 
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excellent opportunity to better understand how communities respond. This tiered incentive 
structure of the CRS program can distort participating communities’ efforts to reduce their flood 
risks and become more resilient to future flood disasters. In theory, relative to having no subsidy, 
the CRS incentives should induce more flood mitigation activity by some participating 
communities while other participants merely receive subsidies for activity they would have done 
anyway.  In order to evaluate the performance of CRS vis-à-vis its tiered incentive structure, we 
investigate (1) the extent to which communities are responsive to CRS incentives, and (2) the 
characteristics of those communities that are responsive to CRS incentives.  By responsive 
communities, we mean communities that are changing their behaviors as a result of the non-
linear incentive design of CRS (e.g., engaging in more flood mitigation activity), regardless of 
whether that response was intended or not. The CRS may encourage more flood management 
effort, and it might also favor certain types of activities with an implicit opportunity cost in terms 
of other policy alternatives.  For example, responsive communities might select a 
disproportionate number of less expensive or “passive” activities (Brody et al. 2009; Sadiq 2010) 
in order to achieve a greater CRS subsidy. Such responsive behavior of communities may 
indicate inefficiencies in the current, tiered CRS structure (Zahran et al. 2010). Inefficiencies 
such as this could ultimately undermine the effectiveness of the CRS program and hinder 
communities’ ability to build the local capacity needed to reduce their flood risks. In short, the 
incentive scheme created by the CRS will influence its ultimate effectiveness, create 
opportunities for participating communities to undertake certain behaviors, and potentially 
distort community responses in unintended ways.   
In the following section, we give a brief background on the CRS program and then 
examine the literature on CRS participation. Next, we present our theoretical model and discuss 
the methodology.  We investigate communities’ responsiveness by examining statistical 
discontinuities around CRS tiers using national data on historical CRS participation, local flood 
risks, demographics from the Census, and government characteristics from the Census of 
Governments.  Then we present our findings and discuss their implications. We conclude with 
policy recommendations for increasing local capacity and enhancing community resilience. 
1.1. The Community Rating System 
Due to increasing disaster losses in the US, the US Congress established the NFIP through the 
passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. Communities can participate in the NFIP 
by adopting and enforcing floodplain management ordinances in exchange for federally backed 
flood insurance (Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 2011). NFIP also developed 
the Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), which depicts the base flood elevations, flood zones, and 
floodplain boundaries of the nation’s communities. These maps help homeowners, renters, and 
insurance companies identify flood risk (FEMA 2002). Recognizing that buildings constructed 
prior to the adoption of FIRM were not likely to have known about flood hazard risks, pre-FIRM 
buildings receive subsidized insurance rates. However, a community participating in CRS has to 
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make sure that new construction abides by the existing community floodplain management 
ordinances (FEMA 2002).   
The Community Rating System was implemented in 1990 to enhance incentives for 
communities to go beyond the NFIP requirements to address flood risks. The program has three 
main objectives; reduce flood losses, strengthen accurate insurance ratings, and foster awareness 
of flood insurance (King 2013). When communities participate in CRS, they not only reduce 
their flood risks they also enjoy discounted premiums (up to 45%) on federally required flood 
insurance, respective to their community’s CRS score. To date, over 1,200 communities from all 
50 states are participating voluntarily in the CRS program, achieving a wide range of ratings 
(FEMA 2013a). Credited activities to be completed by communities fall into 4 major categories: 
public information activities, mapping and regulations, flood damage reduction activities, and 
warning and response (see Table 2). Public information activities promote the purchase of 
insurance, advise people about their flood hazards, and provide information on how to reduce 
risks. Mapping and regulation activities increase the protection for new development, while flood 
damage reduction activities address the risks present in current structures and infrastructure. 
Lastly, the warning and response activities are those that prepare communities to respond during 
flood events (FEMA 2013a). 
Table 1 - CRS Classes, Credit Points, and Premium Discounts Based on Location In or 
Outside Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA). 
CRS Class Credit Points Premium Reduction 
In SFHA (%) Outside SFHA (%) 
1 4,500+ 45 10 
2 4,000-4,999 40 10 
3 3,500-3,999 35 10 
4 3,000-3,499 30 10 
5 2,500-2,999 25 10 
6 2,000-2,499 20 10 
7 1,500-1,999 15 5 
8 1,000-1,499 10 5 
9 500-999 5 5 
10 0-499 0 0 
Source: FEMA (2013b).  
 
Table 2 - Credit Points Awarded for CRS Activities. 
Activity Maximum Possible 
Points 
Percent of Communities 
Credited* 
Passive (Information-based) Activity   
300 Public Information Activities   
   310 Elevation Certificates 116 100% 
   320 Map Information Service 90 93 
   330 Outreach Projects 360 90 
   340 Hazard Disclosure 80 68 
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   350 Flood Protection Information 125 92 
   360 Flood Protection Assistance 110 41 
Active (Non-information-based) Activity   
400 Mapping and Regulations   
   410 Floodplain Mapping 802 50% 
   420 Open Space Preservation 2,020 68 
   430 Higher Regulatory Standards 2,042 98 
   440 Flood Data Maintenance 222 87 
   450 Stormwater Management 755 83 
500 Flood Damage Reduction Activities   
   510 Floodplain Mgmt. Planning 622 43% 
   520 Acquisition and Relocation 1,900 23 
   530 Flood Protection 1,600 11 
   540 Drainage System Maintenance 570 78 
600 Warning and Response   
   610 Flood Warning and Response 395 37% 
   620 Levees 235 0 
   630 Dams 160 0 
*Includes communities credited partially. Source: adapted from FEMA (2013b).  
 
 
 
1.2. Factors Influencing CRS Participation 
This study investigates how communities respond to top-down incentives to promote community 
resilience to flood risks.  Overcoming collective action problems to provide community flood 
resilience – a classic example of a common-pool resource (Ostrom 1990) – poses one of the most 
fundamental challenges to environmental policy (Mansbridge 2013).  The CRS context 
represents a case of a national government overtly subsidizing local governments to provide for 
the flood resilience commons (Mansbridge 2013).  The CRS program resembles conventional 
environmental policy as a top-down directive or subsidy, but it departs from typical US federal 
environmental policy in that it bypasses state governments, directly targets local governments, 
and ostensibly promotes provision of local commons-community flood resilience.  Even as major 
programs like the NFIP emphasize insurance for private property owners (FEMA 2011), Landry 
and Jahan-Parvar (2011), Petrolia et al. (2013), and Poussin et al. (2014) focus on flood 
mitigation activities of individual households, but did not examine how CRS incentives affect 
what participating communities do.  Much less is known about flood mitigation activities by 
communities. Through the NFIP and CRS, the federal government encourages local communities 
to implement flood risk management measures by providing commensurate premium reductions 
(to homeowners, an even smaller units), but also risks some actors behaving strategically to take 
advantage of the CRS.  This might result in unintended communities responding (e.g., those 
facing lower flood risks) or communities responding in unintended ways (e.g., receiving 
subsidies for activities that would have been done anyway).  
Researchers have examined the factors associated with communities that participate in 
the CRS program. For instance, Brody et al. (2009) use the CRS as a case study to understand 
policy learning for flood mitigation, while Posey (2009) uses the CRS as a proxy for adaptive 
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capacity and examines whether the socio-economic status of individuals in a community was a 
determinant of adaptive capacity. Zahran et al. (2009) study the correlation between flood 
insurance purchase by households and CRS participation by local governments in Florida, 
calling for future research into causes of CRS participation. Furthermore, Landry and Li (2012) 
examine the influence of local capacity, hydrological risk factors, and flood experience on 
community hazard mitigation decisions (i.e., CRS participation) in North Carolina counties. 
Finally, Noonan and Sadiq (forthcoming) examine why some communities choose to participate 
in CRS and other do not, and the predictors of CRS scores conditional on participation. They 
found that local capacity, flood risk factors, socio-demographic characteristics, and political 
economy factors are important determinants of CRS participation. They also found that the 
predictors of CRS participation are not the same drivers of CRS scores. This literature points to a 
close relationship between community flood mitigation efforts and demographics, property 
values, and flood risk. 
This study contributes to this literature on community flood risk management and builds 
upon the work of Zahran et al. (2010). These researchers analyze the relationship between the 
nonlinear incentive structure of CRS and observed changes in CRS points and find incentive 
responsiveness by some local jurisdictions in Florida. Furthermore, they conclude that 
communities may be behaving strategically in order to take advantage of the CRS program by 
emphasizing “easy gains” in the CRS and neglecting some floodplains to cut mitigation costs. 
We heed their call for a multi-state study to produce more generalizable results and for more 
attention to the implications of nonlinear incentive structures and community responsiveness. 
National studies of the CRS are lacking, and previous studies have not been able to isolate the 
effect of the CRS incentives on flood mitigation from other (latent) demand for flood mitigation 
in that community; this study leverages the nonlinearity in the CRS incentive scheme to identify 
which CRS participants are indeed responsive to the CRS incentives in determining the flood 
mitigation efforts. Thus, our study extends Zahran et al. (2010) by identifying the extent of 
communities’ responses to federal incentives to increase community flood mitigation (rather than 
just receive the subsidy for no additional effort) and describing how community characteristics 
differ between responsive and nonresponsive jurisdictions across a national sample.  
2. Methods 
 
2.1. Tiered incentive schemes 
 
A key feature of the CRS is its nonlinear or “tiered” incentive scheme, where subsidies (flood 
insurance discounts) increase along intervals of Credit points earned by a community.  These 
kind of tiered policy instruments are common, although their implications have not received 
commensurate attention (Sallee and Slemrod 2012).  The US Gas Guzzler Tax, green building 
and appliance certification programs, and nonattainment areas for air pollution are all prominent 
environmental examples of incentives designed to accrue discontinuously, once a quantitative 
threshold has been crossed.  Such designs provide particular incentives with predictable 
behavioral consequences, relative to no policy at all and relative to a continuous, linear incentive 
scheme (e.g., emissions taxes).  Appendix B in the Supplementary Materials details a theory of 
these tiered incentive systems and how it applies to the CRS context. 
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In short, the federal subsidy leads to a new distribution of flood mitigation activity.  
Relative to a (revenue-neutral) scenario with a linear subsidy, some communities will opt to 
“upgrade” to the next tier while others will “downgrade” and achieve nothing more than the 
minimum standard to reach their current tier.  (See Fig. B1 in Appendix B.)  In this comparison, 
the net effect of the CRS’s tiered incentive system is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the 
distribution of the net benefits of upgrading versus downgrading.  The post-policy distribution of 
CRS Credit points should completely bunch up just above the tier thresholds.  Arguably the more 
important comparison for evaluating the CRS is between the tiered CRS system and a policy 
with no subsidies.  Appendix B discusses the theoretical implications in greater detail.  Relative 
to scenarios with no subsidy, community efforts are either greater or unchanged (no 
downgrading), depending on that community’s particular (economic, political, other) calculus.  
The post-policy distribution of Credit points should also bunch just above tier thresholds, 
although some communities will persist in the points interval in the middle of their tier because 
the net upgrade costs outweigh the incremental subsidy gain (see Fig. A2 in the Appendix).  
 
The distributional implications of the CRS’s tiered incentive scheme are essential here.  
The discontinuous subsidy makes it possible to identify the responsive communities.  This is the 
first theoretical prediction to be tested in the empirical analysis.  Theory predicts both bunching 
just above thresholds by upgrading communities and some mid-tier observations from 
communities unaffected by the incentive.  Thus, identifying the extent to which communities are 
bunching above thresholds – and how those communities differ – describes how much of an 
impact the CRS has had on community mitigation behavior.  This is the second hypothesis to 
follow from the theoretical discussion (see Appendix B).  The empirical analysis tests whether 
communities bunching above thresholds – the responsive communities – will systematically 
differ from those just below thresholds. 
 
 
2.2. Regression Discontinuity Approach 
 
Since its introduction by Thistlethwaite and Campbell in 1960, RD design has been used in 
various domains (e.g., education, environment, health) to ascertain program or policy 
effectiveness (Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960; Lee and Lemieux 2010; Matisoff et al. 2014; 
Noonan 2014). The basic premise behind an RD design is to examine treatment effects, where 
receiving treatment depends on some factor (x) exceeding an arbitrarily set threshold (t), by 
looking at observations with just above and just below the threshold.  Such a comparison 
identifies the causal effect of treatment by leveraging the seemingly random assignment of 
treatment to observations just above threshold rather than those, otherwise equivalent, 
observations just below.  The effect of a large incremental discount in flood insurance premiums 
under the CRS would, in principle, be identifiable via an RD approach because these CRS tiers 
are based on arbitrary threshold scores.  Effects of CRS subsidies on outcome variables (e.g., 
flood damages suffered, new floodplain development) could be readily estimated under the 
assumption that communities cannot precisely manipulate their CRS points around the 
thresholds.3  Otherwise, causal effects remain elusive as communities non-randomly select into 
subsidy “treatment” levels. 
                                                          
3 Although, communities can choose which programs to implement and, consequently, have some control over the 
CRS scores they obtain, the ultimate decision on their actual and final CRS scores is in the hands of a CRS specialist 
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An advantage of RD design, especially relative to other approaches like instrumental 
variables, is that the randomness of the assignment above and below the threshold can be tested 
(Lee and Lemieux 2010).  Standard RD approaches can be applied to the CRS context to assess 
whether communities are systematically sorting into the treatment.  If the communities scoring 
just above the point threshold associated with, say, Class 8 looked no different than those scoring 
just below Class 8, then more confidence might be given to basing causal inferences on a 
comparison of outcome variables between those two community types.  Conversely, if those two 
community types had markedly different baseline conditions, then we should be suspicious of 
ascribing causality to the CRS nonlinear incentives.   
 
More importantly for this study, however, detecting a story about self-selection in this 
context implies systematic responsiveness at the community level and illuminates how the CRS 
is spurring responsiveness from different communities.  This is nontraditional use of RD, where 
identifying causal effects is typically the aim.  Here, we emphasize tests common to RD design 
that allow us to identify systematic patterns in CRS participation around thresholds.  Even 
though self-selecting around thresholds means we cannot make causal inferences about CRS 
participation on outcome variables that the CRS might seek to influence (e.g., flood losses, 
resiliency), we can infer which and how communities respond to the nonlinear subsidy treatment.  
The portfolio of flood mitigation activities for communities cannot simply be said to be caused 
by CRS, as some activities would have been done regardless.  Rather, spikes in frequencies of 
certain activities (e.g., information provision) at thresholds are associated with those responsive, 
upgrading communities.  We can show participants’ self-selection in response to CRS incentives, 
something that studies of CRS’s causal effects would do well to address.  
 
The test that we use to detect whether variables differ on either side of a threshold comes 
from Porter (2003).  This nonparametric approach estimates, for each variable of interest, it’s 
right and left limits at the threshold(s) using local linear regressions.4 The difference (α) between 
the limits taken from the right and taken from the left reveal the presence of a discontinuity, in 
our case implying some strategic “sorting” by communities around the tier thresholds.  
Alternative bandwidths for the kernel-weighted regressions are selected and tested, reflecting a 
standard bias-versus-precision tradeoff.  Narrower bandwidths should be subject to less bias 
from underlying trends in the data, but they also leverage less data in the analysis and thus 
possess less precision.  Larger bandwidths make use of more data but may invite influences, 
other than the sharp discontinuity itself, to affect the results by looking further beyond the 
threshold.  Our analysis uses relatively narrow bandwidths of 20, 25, and 30,5 reporting the 
middle value in the main analysis (and relegating the sensitivity check for larger and smaller 
bandwidths to an appendix).  Further, we conduct numerous falsification tests to see if these tests 
can detect discontinuities at “interior” CRS scores (e.g., 723) for which there should be no 
threshold or discontinuity.  Appendix A reports the results from one sample falsification test. 
                                                          
after implementation. This argument is corroborated by the CRS Coordination Manual: “Only the final, verified 
credit calculated by the ISO/CRS Specialist after the verification visit determines a community’s total points.” 
(FEMA 2013: 110-7) 
4 Basically, a kernel-weighted local regression is fit using only data to the left of the threshold, another kernel-
weighted local regressions is fit using only data to the right, and the difference in their predicted values at the 
threshold is α. 
5 Zahran et al. (2010) use 50 points above thresholds as a cutoff to capture those relevant observations. 
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2.3.  Data 
 
Four data sources are combined to inform the analysis. Data on CRS participation is obtained 
from the 2013 CRS Coordinator’s Manual (FEMA 2013b). Underlying flood risk data from 
FEMA (1996) offer very high resolution (1 km grid cell) rankings of flood risk (on a 0-100 
scale) based on data that largely predate the start of the CRS program.  Information about the 
population and housing stock of communities is obtained from 1990 block-group level Census 
data from US Census Bureau (1993). Furthermore, information about government expenditures 
and revenues is taken from the 1992 Census of Government (1992), the earliest available Census 
data on local governments’ finances.  The unit of analysis for this study is the community 
participating in the CRS, which includes cities, villages, towns, townships, other incorporated 
places as well as counties.  Each community is mapped onto flood risk and Census data and, 
non-county communities are matched to a host county for consistency in analysis. All variables 
are taken from 1990 or as close to that date as possible in order to better match to conditions 
existing before the start of the CRS program. An effective CRS program might cause changes to 
communities’ flood risk, housing stock, and other socio-economic indicators.  Hence using 
historical measures rather than current ones avoids this endogeneity concern and sharpens the 
interpretation that these community attributes are driving responsiveness to CRS incentives 
rather than the CRS is causing changes in community conditions. The latter may still be true, but 
is not tested here. 
 
2.4. Variables 
 
The primary variable for this analysis is the total CRS Credit points for each community.  Figure 
1 shows the distribution of these credit points. The red lines represent classes 9 (500-999 credit 
points) to 1 (4,400+ credit points).  As is evident from glancing at Figure 1, few communities 
rate better than Class 6 and there is a strong reverse sawtooth wave pattern in the data around the 
thresholds associated with higher subsidies. Communities eschew point totals just below 
thresholds and tend to gravitate toward values just above thresholds.  It is quite clear from Figure 
1 that there is clustering just above the 1,000, 1500, 2000, and 2500 credit thresholds. 
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Fig. 1 - Histogram of CRS credits points obtained by CRS Communities.  
 
Following Sadiq’s (2010) classification of risk-reducing measures, we group the 18 CRS 
activities6 in Table 2 into active and passive activities to have a better understanding of the 
responsiveness of communities. Active activities are proactive (non-information) flood control 
activities undertaken by communities to address flood risks, while passive activities are aimed at 
informing the public about flood–related issues. Active activities include, but are not limited to 
structural measures like dam and levee construction, open space preservation, acquisition and 
relocation, and flood warning and response. These active activities, for the most part, require 
large capital outlay. On the other hand, passive (information-based) activities include 
informational items that are designed to educate community residents about the dangers of floods 
and what residents should do before, during, and after a flood.  Examples of passive activities 
include map information services, hazard disclosure, and flood protection information.  Passive 
activities are relatively cheaper than active activities to implement. As a result, we consider 
passive activities as “low hanging fruits” (Brody et al. 2009: 926; Landry and Li 2012: 216) that 
more responsive communities would use as “fillers” to upgrade to a higher CRS class.  
In order to understand whether there is a difference in the characteristics of communities 
just above a class threshold (the theoretically responsive communities) and just below that 
threshold (the non-responsive communities), we explore communities’ demographics, property 
values, and flood risk. We select these attributes because previous researchers found a significant 
relationship between them and CRS participation. For example, researchers have found 
significant and positive relationships between flood risk and CRS participation (e.g., Posey 2009; 
                                                          
6 We did not include the new activity 370 “Flood Insurance Promotions” because we have no information on it. 
Class 9 Class 8 Class 7 Class 6 Class 5 Class 4 Class 3 Class 2 Class 1 
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Zahran et al. 2010; Landry and Li 2012). In addition, researchers have found significant and 
positive relationship between population density and local flood mitigation (Brody et al. 2009; 
Zahran et al. 2010) and between housing values and the adoption of flood mitigation measures 
(Landry and Li 2012). Our study is the first we know of to examine whether government 
capacity affects CRS responsiveness. In addition to CRS points, the community variables 
considered in this analysis include: 
1. Active Share. This is the proportion of the total CRS points that comes from proactive/non-
information activities. Active program points are the sum of credits from activities 410-630 
(see Table 2). We expect communities that appear more responsive to CRS incentives (i.e., 
just above thresholds) to have a lower Active Share as these communities use CRS credits 
from passive activities as filler to upgrade CRS classes. 
2. Flood Risk. This is the peak mean flood risk in the county.7 Communities with high flood 
risk may be more likely to have undertaken flood mitigation activities, regardless of the CRS, 
and potentially less likely to be responsive to CRS incentives.  Alternatively, they may be 
more aware of or sensitive to the NFIP (and subsidies) and thus more likely to upgrade. 
3. Payroll. From the 1992 Census of Governments, this is the log of the participating 
jurisdiction’s (county or place) per-capita payroll expenses, full-time plus part-time.  We 
expect this measure of local government capacity to positively relate to community 
responsiveness to CRS incentives. 
4. Income. This is the log of county median household income.  Wealthier communities may be 
more likely to be responsive to CRS incentives. 
5. Housing Value.  This is the log of median housing value for the community. Communities 
with higher housing values may be less likely to be responsive to CRS incentives if 
homeowners already undertake personal protective measures against flood (Landry and Li 
2012).  Conversely, greater property values exposed to flood risk may enhance the value of 
subsidized insurance premiums and increase responsiveness. 
6. Population Density. This is persons per km2. Like for Flood Risk and Housing Value, greater 
population density implies greater exposure to flood damages and thus the likelihood that 
communities have already undertaken flood mitigation activities regardless of CRS.  In 
addition to being less sensitive to CRS incentives, they might also face larger upgrading costs 
in highly developed or “built out” cities.  
 
3. Results 
To test for discontinuities around the CRS thresholds, each of the program’s thresholds is 
examined per Porter (2003) at various bandwidths for each of the variables.  Table 3 reports the 
main results for the lowest two thresholds (1000, 1500) using the moderate bandwidth.8  
Thresholds for higher classes (above Class 7) with bigger insurance subsidies are not reported 
here because there were too few observations to permit statistical testing at those levels with 
                                                          
7 Each 1km grid cell raster map from FEMA (1996) is mapped to over 200,000 Census block groups to obtain a 
mean flood risk value for each of these neighborhood-scale units in the nation.  Flood Risk is set to the maximum 
(block-group mean) flood risk value within each county.  Other aggregations of localized flood risk measures are, of 
course, possible.  The max-mean function is selected because it provided the strongest and most consistent predictor 
of overall CRS participation among a sample of 28,147 US places. 
8 Tests for the first, lowest threshold at 500 points are not possible because communities and their CRS scores are 
not observed if the score falls below 500. 
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reasonable bandwidths.  There are very few communities in the neighborhood of 2,000 CRS 
points, and far fewer at higher levels.   
Table 3 - Test for Discontinuity at Thresholds 1000 and 1500 (Bandwidth 25) 
 Threshold 1000   
(Bandwidth 25) 
Threshold 1500  
(Bandwidth 25) 
Variable mean α p mean α p 
Active Share 0.8972 -0.245 0*** 0.7730 -0.097 0.122 
Flood Risk 92.8128 -10.577 0.094* 97.3842 -5.031 0.649 
Payroll 5.0154 -1.632 0.010*** 1.9363 1.479 0*** 
Income 10.3371 -0.119 0.478 9.8025 0.618 0*** 
Housing Value 11.8531 -0.815 0*** 10.4656 1.13 0*** 
Population 
Density 
2800 -2200 0*** 426.0833 246.885 0.579 
***p < 0.01   **p < 0.05    *p < 0.1 
Table 3 presents the results of the test for discontinuity at thresholds 1000 and 1500 with 
a bandwidth of 25. The mean value column indicates the estimated average value of the variable 
at the threshold, and the α column shows the estimated change in that value associated with 
crossing the threshold to the right.  For instance, the Active Share row suggests that CRS class 9 
communities just below the 1,000 point threshold have almost 90 percent of their points from 
“active” programs, yet CRS class 8 communities just above the 1,000-point threshold have only 
65 percent [(0.8972 – 0.245) x 100] of their points from active measures.  Active Share falls by 
almost 0.25 at that 1,000-point threshold.  Communities influenced by the tiered incentive at low 
levels of CRS subsidy tend to do a lot more passive programs.  At the 1,500-point threshold, 
however, the decline in Active Share (hence increase in passive share) is smaller and not 
statistically significant.   
Other community characteristics also differ for those responding to the tiered incentive.  
At the 1,000-point threshold between Class 9 and Class 8, communities able to receive the 10% 
discount had much lower average property values, population densities, and government capacity 
than those receiving only half that discount.  They also tended to face lower peak flood risks.  
The comparison in estimated median housing values just below ($140,519) and above ($62,199) 
the 1,000-point threshold suggests a striking disparity in the types of communities seeking the 
increased subsidy.  The lower Payroll and government capacity among responsive communities 
at this low-level of CRS participation suggests that local government size need not drive 
community-level flood mitigation efforts.9 Income did not look different on either side of the 
threshold.  In short, for participating communities on the lower end of the spectrum of flood 
resilience efforts, those most responsive to the uptick in insurance subsidies tended to have lower 
                                                          
9 Alternate measures of government capacity were also explored, including total payroll outlays, total property tax 
revenues, property tax revenues per capita, and capital outlays for sewage, solid waste management, and water 
transport.  Each returned qualitatively the same results. 
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property values, flood risks, and population densities (i.e., they have less property and life at risk, 
and they are cheaper to subsidize).   
At the 1,500-point threshold between Class 8 and Class 7, however, the results change.  
Unlike the lower threshold, communities above the 1,500-point threshold had much higher 
property values than their counterparts in communities scoring just below that threshold. These 
jurisdictions had larger governments and greater household wealth.  Also unlike at the lower 
threshold, the upgrading communities here had no different densities or flood risks.  More 
generally, the selectivity or sorting by communities is different at different levels of 
participation. For the higher classes of participants, above Class 7, this analysis generally reveals 
no significant discontinuities for these variables and at these bandwidths.  While it may result 
from declining statistical power with fewer observations, it might also follow from increasingly 
random sorting around the thresholds.  Figure 1 shows no appreciable bunching at Class 6 and 
above.   
The results for alternative bandwidths (Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A) indicate a great 
deal of consistency in results.  Both the magnitude of the discontinuity and the statistical 
significance of the tests tend to be closely aligned with the results shown in Table 3, especially 
where the effects are statistically significant.  For these significant effects, the larger bandwidths 
tend to attenuate the observed effects (i.e., narrower bandwidth imply larger α values).  
Accordingly, the results in Table 3 can be seen as somewhat conservative estimates of effect 
sizes.  The falsification tests suggest that there are no discontinuities where we would not expect 
them. 
4. Discussion 
There are three major results evident from the RD approach to these CRS data.  First, 
communities that respond to the nonlinear, tiered incentives in the CRS program look different 
than those participating communities that do not.  Among participating communities undertaking 
less flood mitigation, the responsive communities had decidedly lower flood risks, lower 
property values,10 lower government payrolls, and lower population densities.  The larger 
subsidies went to communities that started with less flood risk, less property and population 
exposed to that risk, and arguably less government capacity.  This may reflect the circumstances 
of moderate flood risk communities, where risks are severe enough to warrant moderate, fairly 
low-cost flood mitigation efforts.  Communities in these circumstances that upgrade in response 
to CRS are those seeking bargains and more federal support and may face less (political) 
resistance or severe costs to mitigate more. 
 Among participants with more flood mitigation, the CRS gave greater subsidies to 
communities with more resources (more valuable property, more income, bigger government 
budgets) even though their flood risks did not differ. Here, the self-selection mechanism clearly 
                                                          
10 We also examined the share of housing units in the top-coded value category of $500,000 or above.  The share of 
very large, expensive homes in the community also fell discontinuously at the 1000-point threshold.  It appeared 
evenly distributed around the 1500-point threshold. 
13 
 
favors the communities better able to identify and finance the upgrading activities – which might 
be more costly (and hence less “passive”) than the upgrading activities at the 1,000-point 
threshold.  It is also consistent with communities with bigger subsidy benefits (i.e., those with 
more expensive flood insurance premiums) effectively upgrading to Class 7. 
Second, communities that respond to the program’s thresholds participate in CRS 
differently than those participating communities that do not.  At lower levels of flood mitigation, 
responsive communities – the ones upgrading to higher levels of subsidy – tend to adopt 
substantially more passive CRS activities. If passive programs are less effective at reducing 
community flood risks, such communities may be more likely to suffer greater disaster losses 
from floods if upgrading to Class 8 provides reduced insurance premiums that might make those 
communities behave recklessly with regard to flood risk management (Zahran et al. 2009). 
Third, while these results strictly speaking refer to differences in communities above and 
below thresholds, they speak to larger issues of the community responsiveness to CRS subsidies 
more generally.  As portrayed in the theoretical model (section 2.1), communities can be thought 
of as having an underlying baseline of flood management effort.  The CRS induces a “lumpy” 
distribution on top of a presumably smooth baseline distribution as some communities upgrade 
their efforts in order to capture a bigger subsidy.  Some communities just accept and enjoy the 
subsidies associated with their baseline, and they remain well below the next threshold.   
More than identifying how common “upgrading” communities are, it also helps to 
appreciate what they are doing differently to upgrade.  At lower levels of CRS participation, the 
results from this vantage are striking because the communities most responsive to the CRS 
incentive scheme have less property and life at risk of flood and face lower flood risks.  That 
might make them less expensive to subsidize via the CRS, but it also suggests that the most 
important target communities may not be reached by the CRS incentives. Further, the fact that 
upgrading occurs via more passive efforts raises questions about the CRS program’s 
effectiveness in reducing community flood risks, especially amid growing concerns of increased 
climate change-induced precipitation (IPCC 2012). 
The lack of systematic evidence of sorting around higher CRS thresholds (Class 5 and 
above) raises some interesting issues. If high-intensity participants all tended to upgrade, then 
insufficient data below the threshold would limit this test’s ability to detect any effects.  
Alternatively, if high-intensity participants only upgraded at random, then no effects would be 
detected.  The policy implications of either story are quite different, and more investigation 
(likely of a qualitative nature) is warranted. 
5. Conclusion 
The Community Ratings System was designed to encourage communities to build local capacity 
to address flood risks and become more resilient to future flood disasters. We argue that its tiered 
incentive structure distorts the efforts of participating communities to enhance their capacity to 
reduce their flood risks and become more resilient to future flood disasters. Although, previous 
research has found that the nonlinear incentive structure of the CRS program creates 
opportunities for communities participating in the CRS program to be responsive to the CRS 
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incentives, no study has examined the characteristics of communities that are responding to CRS 
incentives. There is clear evidence of responsiveness around the thresholds to higher subsidies 
for the lower classes of the CRS, where the vast majority of participating communities are.  
While classes 6 – 9 may be disappointingly common among CRS participants, from FEMA’s 
perspective at least the clustering above thresholds supports the case of at least modest behavior 
impact of CRS.  At the lower end of flood mitigation efforts, communities with more passive 
activities, lower property values, lower peak flood risk, and lower population densities are more 
likely to be responsive to the system for bigger subsidies. As flood mitigation effort levels rise to 
the next tier, the pattern shifts such that CRS communities with more resources (and no more 
flood risk) are the ones responsive to CRS incentives. It is ambiguous whether the 
responsiveness we uncover among communities with the aforementioned characteristics is 
unintended or intended. The answer to this question depends on what FEMA hopes to achieve 
with the current CRS incentive structure.  
Based on the results of this study, we offer the following recommendations. First, FEMA 
should invest more in tracking outcomes and base its award system (i.e., points) on evidence 
linking the activity to those outcomes.  The relative effectiveness of informational activities, 
especially given their heavy use by responsive communities, merits careful attention.  Additional 
benefit-cost analysis that identifies the additional flooding mitigation attributable to the CRS 
program could both demonstrate the social benefits of this program as well as potentially attract 
new participants.  Second, it is imperative for FEMA to re-examine the incentive structure of 
CRS to ensure that communities that are vulnerable to the impact of floods (e.g., communities 
that have a high proportion of their properties in the Special Flood Hazard Area) are encouraged 
to participate in the CRS program. Flood mitigation incentives have been shown to have a 
positive impact on household decisions to adoption flood mitigation measures (Poussin et al. 
2014) in addition to their positive effect on flood mitigation evidenced here. Lowering 
administrative costs of participation may help particularly vulnerable communities to enhance 
their efforts. In so doing, FEMA may be able to increase participation in the CRS program, 
enhance the capacity of local communities to reduce flood risks and ultimately become more 
resilient to future flood disasters.  
An important and unexpected result is the switching of signs on payroll, income, housing 
value, and population density as we move from threshold 1000 to 1500. While we do not have an 
overpowering theoretical rationale for this shift, this finding shows that the CRS incentive as 
currently designed has different appeals at different credit point thresholds. The implication is 
that the one-size-fits-all approach of the CRS incentive scheme has substantially different 
impacts for communities in classes 7 and 8 (thresholds 1000 and 1500, respectively). If FEMA’s 
goal with the CRS incentive structure is to engender differential impacts on communities 
participating at varying levels/classes, then our study provides evidence to support this goal. 
However, if FEMA’s goal is to elicit similar behavioral changes for all CRS classes, our results 
suggest that there might be need to recalibrate the current CRS incentive program.  
These data do not allow us to examine why some CRS communities are responsive to 
CRS incentives or precisely estimate how much communities upgraded their score in response to 
the incentives. Future research would do well to further examine the drivers of community 
responsiveness to CRS incentives. Shedding light on the motivations and processes behind the 
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strategic responses of communities can inform policy designs to boost community resilience to 
increasing flood risks. These results also reinforce the importance of considering local 
communities as strategic actors in adapting to external forces – be they national incentive 
programs or climate change.  Community’s flood mitigation efforts are not randomly assigned or 
independent of their expected benefits.  Programs that promote those benefits can go a long way 
toward engendering responses from communities.  If they predictably game the system, then 
policymakers can promote greater resilience through carefully designed incentives.  
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